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Abstract
Agents in the real world must be capable of autonomous goal
creation. One effect of this ability is that the agent may gener-
ate a substantial number of goals, but only a small number of
these will be relevant at any one time. Therefore, there is a need
for some heuristic mechanism to control an agent’s reasoning
attention. Such a mechanism is presented in this paper: alarms.
Alarms serve to focus the attention of the agent on the most
salient goals, and thereby avoid unnecessary reasoning. In this
way, a resource-bounded agent can employ modern planning
methods to effectiveness.
Introduction
It is widely recognised that if an autonomous agent is required
to interact with a real-world domain,
 
a static set of goals is
not a sufficiently flexible representation of the agent’s pur-
pose (Brooks, 1986; Carbonell, 1982; Long & Fox, 1995; Si-
mon, 1967; Sloman, 1987; Wilensky, 1983). The domain may
change at any time such that pursuing a goal may no longer be
realistic, required, or even possible. A single goal may need
to be satisfied more than once, or periodically, depending on
how the domain evolves over time. So, an autonomous agent
must have the ability to set itself goals (cf. Luck & d’Inverno
(1995)). Such a capability has been investigated to varying
degrees and for different purposes in a number of systems in-
cluding PANDORA (Wilensky, 1983), Pengi (Agre & Chap-
man, 1987), PRS (Georgeff & Lansky, 1987), and NML1
(Beaudoin & Sloman, 1993; Beaudoin, 1994). In general,
goals are set in response to changes in the domain that are rel-
evant to the agent. The work presented here is motivated by
two observations about the nature of goals that have important
consequences in models of agency.
1. The time at which changes in the domain that may lead to
the generation of a goal are detected is not necessarily the
time at which the agent should act on that goal. Action may
be required some time in the future.
2. Some goals tend to recur periodically, or at particular times
of the day/week/etc. (Goals that recur in this way have
been referred to as cyclical satisfaction goals (Schank &

The domain of an agent is its internal state and the state of the
external environment that the agent perceives. A real-world domain
is a domain that can neither be completely nor correctly modelled.
Abelson, 1977) and replenishment goals (Ortony, Clore &
Collins, 1988).) These goals persist; they are not aban-
doned once achieved, their influence is simply mitigated.
Then, as time passes, the intensityof the influence increases
until the goal recurs. However, the important role that time
plays in the generation of these types of goal has not been
fully appreciated.
An agent that is capable of autonomous goal creation, po-
tentially can have an unlimited number of goals. However,
the number of goals for which action is required now will
be a small number of these. Furthermore, all real agents are
resource-bounded (Simon, 1957), so there is a limit on the
number of goals that can be attended to at any one time.

An
additional complication is that the process of distinguishing
between goals that warrant attention and those that do not, it-
self depletes resources. Therefore, in any resource-bounded
agent an heuristic mechanism is required to focus resources
on the most salient goals; i.e. to avoid unnecessary reasoning
(Norman & Long, 1995). Such a mechanism has been char-
acterised as “fast but stupid” by Sloman (1987). An heuristic
mechanism for the control of reasoning attention is presented
in this paper: alarms. This mechanism has been implemented
and tested on a simulated warehouse agent, and intuitive ex-
amples from this domain are used throughout the paper.
Goals
In AI planning systems, a goal is seen as a proposition, or a
well formed formula in the world model, to be made true. The
purpose of the planner is to search for a sequence of operators
(a plan) that will transform the current state into one where a
given goal or goals hold. Planning research is principallycon-
cerned with the creation of good plans to satisfy a conjunction
of such goals in an efficient way. However, the planning prob-
lem quickly becomes intractable as the number of goals that
must be planned for increases.
Planning is also an important cognitive activity, and plan-
ning systems are useful in explaining certain types of human
decision making. Explanations of human decision making

In fact the load on the agent’s reasoning resources is bounded,
and this load is related to the number of goals that hold attention.
However, some goals are more easy to attain than others, so this is
not necessarily a simple relationship.
typically concentrate on the creation and management of mul-
tiple goals in every day situations, and less on how these goals
are represented or achieved (Beaudoin & Sloman (1993) and
Hayes-Roth (1995) are exceptions). Typically, various types
of goal are identified. For example, Ortony, Clore & Collins
(1988) specify three broad goal types: replenishment goals,
active pursuit goals and interest goals (cf. Schank & Abelson
(1977) and Carbonell (1982)).
In general, goals are the problems to be solved by an agent
through some sort of planning capability. In the work pre-
sented in this paper, a goal is viewed as a proposition to be
made true through purposeful action, but goals can be gen-
erated through different processes. It is different processes
through which goals are generated that distinguish the two
goal types discussed here. The term D-Goal is used to refer
to goals generated through decision, and the term R-Goal is
used to refer to goals generated through replenishment. It is
important to note that goals from different sources are indis-
tinguishable in content and function after they have been gen-
erated. These terms D-Goal and R-Goal refer to the goal and
the process that generated the goal.
D-Goals
Ortony, Clore & Collins (1988) describe active pursuit goals
(analogous to D-Goals) as states of affairs that the agent
wishes to achieve under certain conditions. Necessarily, the
agent must have some reason behind the generation of such a
goal. In the system presented here, simple recognition mech-
anisms, similar to “Noticers” (Wilensky, 1983), are used to
trigger the agent to consider generating D-Goals. Demons
(see figure 1) monitor the external environment and internal
state of the agent, reporting to appropriate mechanisms when
some set of conditions hold. Some of these demons are dedi-
cated to recognising events that may warrant the generation of
a goal. For example, if an agent is informed of a meeting, this
event is reported, and a goal may be generated in response.
 
However, the time at which the agent recognises that some-
thing must be done is not necessarily the time at which its at-
tention should be directed towards doing it. So, goals may be
generated through such a mechanism that are not appropriate
to the agent for some time.
D-Goals have a limited life: They are generated, planned
for, and once they have either been satisfied or are no longer
required, they are deleted. For example, the warehouse agent
may receive a request for an order to be satisfied from a po-
tential customer. If the order is accepted, a goal is generated;
then if the order is satisfied or if the agent no longer wishes to
satisfy the order, the goal is deleted.


A decision based on the agent’s beliefs is a prerequisite to the
generation of a goal in this way (Castelfranchi, 1995), hence the term
D-Goal.
The deletion of a goal for whatever reason may influence other
processes, or even cause the agent to consider generating other goals.
R-Goals
The second type of process through which goals can be gen-
erated is replenishment. Replenishment is an autonomic pro-
cess, and hence does not involve reasoning. Examples: (1)
An agent that has the desire to interact with another agent with
known behavioural patterns may synchronise its activity with
the other agent for its own ends; (2) An agent that is concerned
with maintaining the state of a domain variable may periodi-
cally affect the variable to keep it within acceptable bounds.
Replenishment processes tend to cause the same goals to recur
over certain periods of time or at certain characteristic times
(e.g. at 5pm every day, or every Thursday). There are two dis-
tinct reasons for R-Goals to influence an agent’s behaviour:
1. An agent in a real-world domain is not the sole actor in
that domain. Influences that are independent from the
agent may produce regularities in the domain; e.g. a lec-
ture timetable. For the agent to affect the domain in useful
ways, it may be necessary for it to synchronise its activities
with aspects of the environment that are not under its con-
trol. So, a student who has the desire to pass a course will
be influenced by the recurring goal to have attended partic-
ular lectures.
2. It is advantageous for agents to generate goals in this way,
rather than through decision. (The process of generating a
goal through decision is computationally expensive.) For
example, if a warehouse agent, through some autonomic
process, causes goals to have restocked a commodity to re-
cur every Thursday, in normal circumstances there is no
need to even consider that commodity during the rest of the
week. Replenishment processes allow reasoning resources
to be redirected to more constructive tasks.
Alarms
Focusing attention is an important requirement for an agent
capable of autonomous goal generation for two reasons: (1)
The agent will be influenced by a large number of goals, but
only a small number of these goals will warrant attention at
any one time; and (2) Resource limitations bound the num-
ber of goals that can be considered, or planned for, at any one
time.
This section describes alarm management processes; these
have the effect of focusing an agent’s reasoning attention on
appropriate goals at appropriate times. In the most simple
terms, an alarm
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is a structure that associates a goal
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with a function of intensity over time:
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. This
function is designed to reflect how appropriate the goal is to
the present situation. Typically, as time passes the intensity
of this function increases to a point where it exceeds some
threshold. Then, the attention of the agent is focussed on that
goal. This threshold changes when the situation changes; as
the agent becomes more busy, the threshold increases and vice
versa. Only when an alarm has triggered in this way will the
goal be considered, and possibly activated. Alarms are essen-
tially goal management processes that serve to avoid unnec-
essary reasoning.
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Figure 1: An architecture for goal creation and management.
Alarm generation
D-Goals: When the agent considers that an event (detected
by a demon) warrants the creation of a goal, an appropri-
ate alarm is set (see figure 1). For example, the warehouse
agent contains a demon that will respond to any message
received from a customer. If the customer has placed an or-
der, and this order is acceptable to the agent, then a goal to
have met the order is created. The agent predicts when this
goal needs to achieved, how long it will take to achieve, the
importance of the goal, etc. With this information, a func-
tion of intensity against time is defined, and an alarm cre-
ated.
This function of intensity (figure 2) is specified by defining
the variables
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, and  . The deadline
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is the time at which the agent wishes the goal to have been
satisfied. 


is the period of time that the agent expects
will be required to act to satisfy the goal. With this value
and the deadline, an estimate can be made of the last point
at which the agent should attend to the goal to have it sat-
isfied in time, and hence the time at which the intensity of
the alarm should be maximal:

 . The delay time
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is a time, before which it is not appropriate for the agent to
act on the goal. For example, there is no point in the ware-
house agent preparing an order containing perishable com-
modities if the customer is expected to arrive after the com-
modities will have perished. The times
	
and

 define
a time window where the agent predicts that it is sensible to
activate the goal.
Different goals may have the potential to influence the
agent to varying degrees; this potential is the maximum in-
tensity of the alarm

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. A modification of the Little
Nell problem (McDermott, 1982) is useful in illustrating
the effect of varying alarm potentials. The heroine (Nell)
is tied to the tracks, a train is approaching, and the hero
(Dudley) wishes to save her. The modification is that Dud-
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Figure 2: A general alarm function.
ley is not only influenced by the goal to have saved Nell.
Dudley also has the goal to have sated his hunger. Further-
more, it is lunch time, so the intensity of the alarm encapsu-
lating the goal to have sated his hunger is near-maximum.
Dudley has predicted that Nell will get mashed soon, so the
alarm encapsulating the goal to have saved Nell is also near-
maximum. It is the fact that saving Nell is far more impor-
tant to Dudley that distinguishes these two alarms; i.e. the
variable  for the alarm encapsulating the goal to have
saved Nell is greater than for the other alarm. In fact it is
possible for a goal to be ignored, even if the alarm’s inten-
sity is maximum, if the threshold is sufficiently high (see
the extended example).
Finally, 
	
is the initial intensity of the alarm at the delay
time. Between


and

 , the intensity linearly increases
from 
	
to   . It is possible to define different criteria for
an alarm function, but this depends heavily on the accuracy
of the predictions, or the information they are based on.
R-Goals: The visible effect of an autonomic replenishment
process is to generate a stream of alarms, and hence acti-
vated goals, at appropriate times. Each goal is treated in
the same way as a goal generated through decision by the
planning and control mechanisms. The goal will be acti-
vated, and acted on in the usual way. The function of the
replenishment process is to continually monitor the exist-
ing alarms. If there is an R-Goal that is missing (due to it
having been deleted), a new alarm encapsulating that goal
is automatically created (figure 1).
The function of intensity of this replenished alarm will in-
crease to maximum over some period of time. This pe-
riod may be fixed and the intensity of the alarm increases
as the time since it was last satisfied increases. (This type
of mechanism is consistent with the observations of Ortony,
Clore & Collins (1988) about the nature of replenishment
goals.) For example, the intensity of the alarm encapsulat-
ing the goal to buy milk may increase as the time since the
last visit to the shops for this purpose increases, based on
some estimate of how long a pint (or quart) of milk lasts.
However, the specification of a fixed period of replenish-
ment does not sufficiently express certain types of R-goal
behaviour. If hunger is influenced primarily by social habit,
the alarm could be replenished to increase in intensity over
the periods of time between 08:00, 13:00, and 18:00, caus-
ing goals to be activated around these times in the day. This
is an example of a timetabled R-Goal. Note, this does not
preclude the possibility of a D-Goal to mitigate hunger be-
ing generated at any time.
This R-Goal to satiate hunger is an example of an auto-
nomic replenishment process that is essentially permanent.
However, an agent may have a number of R-Goals that
only exists under certain conditions; these are temporary R-
Goals. For example, the warehouse agent may accept regu-
lar orders from reliable customers under certain conditions.
These regular orders become temporary R-Goals, and will
only exist if the agent continues to believe that the customer
is reliable and that the customer still requires the order. De-
mon processes are again employed to notify the replenish-
ment process that the conditions for the existence of a tem-
porary R-Goal no longer hold. In general, an agent will syn-
chronise its activities with regularities in the environment,
or with other agents, only if the agent considers it advanta-
geous to do so.
Alarm modification
A real-world domain is intrinsicallyuncertain; predictions are
fallible and the normal replenishment of certain goals can be-
come inappropriate. At any time after an alarm has been set,
the domain may change in an unexpected way. Such changes
in the domain may directly cause changes in the intensity of
an alarm.
Opportunities: An opportunity is an action for which all the
preconditions of that action hold in the present state, and
that the achievement of a goal encapsulated in an existing
alarm is a postcondition of that action. By taking an oppor-
tunity, it is possible for the agent (if all goes well) to satisfy
the goal without the need for further planning. The agent is
equipped with a set of opportunity demons, where the con-
ditions for the triggering of that demon are the precondi-
tions of the relevant action. The detection of an opportunity
has the effect of giving the appropriate alarm an impulse of
intensity.   It is possible for such an impulse to increase the
intensity of an alarm over the threshold, cause the alarm to
trigger, and hence possibly activate the goal. If the goal is
activated, the opportunity is communicated to the planning
and control mechanisms of the agent.
Dangers: A danger to a goal is one of three things: (a) A plan,
constructed to satisfy the goal, which has failed; (b) An es-

This impulse exists only for as long as the opportunity exists.
sentially irreversible action

that the agent intends to per-
form which will prevent it from satisfying the goal in time;
or (c) All alarms are based on assumptions about how the
domain will evolve over time. If the agent detects that the
domain has changed such that a salient assumption is no
longer valid, this constitutes a danger to the satisfaction of
the goal. In the same way as opportunity demons, danger
demons notify the agent of a dangerous situation by giv-
ing the alarm that encapsulates the goal that is in danger a
temporary impulse of intensity. An impulse may cause an
alarm to trigger and force the agent to evaluate a possible
danger to the goal encapsulated in that alarm.
Commitments: In the construction of a plan, the agent com-
mits itself to activity at certain times. Commitments reduce
the time available for the agent to act to satisfy other goals.
For example, if an agent plans to travel through a desert,
whether the agent has recently sated its thirst or not, the
goal to have mitigated thirst is appropriate to the situation.
Commitments made by the agent have the effect of shifting
a functionof intensity left along the time axis, and hence the
alarm is evaluated at the time

	


	
, where

is
the time now and 
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is the effect of the commitments that
the agent has made to future action. This alarm may there-
fore be triggered earlier.
Alarm triggering
An alarm is triggered, and hence the goal is considered by the
agent, if the alarm function evaluates at the time
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	
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to a value greater than or equal to some threshold. This thresh-
old is common to all alarms and can have any value above
zero. The threshold has the effect of controlling the sensitivity
of the agent to alarms, and acts to limit the focus of the agent’s
attention. If the threshold is low, the agent will be more sen-
sitive to new goals, and vice versa. However, to effectively
control the focus of attention, this threshold must change in re-
lation to the changing load on the agent’s reasoning resources.
As the agent’s activity increases, the threshold increases and
hence the agent’s sensitivity to new goals is reduced. So, if
the agent has a large number of urgent tasks, it will tend to
leave other alarms that have lower intensity potential to the
last minute or ignore them. However, if the agent has fewer
tasks demanding attention, alarms that have less intensity po-
tential may trigger (the threshold having been lowered), and
goals will generally be considered earlier. The effect of this
system of alarms is to focus reasoning attention on a limited
number of goals so that the planning and control processes are
not swamped with things to do, or even things to think about
doing.
Once a goal is activated, it is important for an agent to then
reconsider the goal at appropriate times (Bratman, Israel &
Pollack, 1988). “Reconsidering a prior intention is an activ-
ity that uses up time and other limited resources” (Bratman,
1992), but determining when goals should be reconsidered

An essentially irreversible action is one that cannot be reversed
in time for the goal to be satisfied in time.
also depletes resources. Therefore, in the same way that an
heuristic is required to determine when goals should be con-
sidered for achievement, a similar mechanism is required to
determine what goals should be reconsidered. For example,
as the deadline of the goal approaches, or if a danger to the
satisfaction of that goal is detected after it has been activated,
it should be reconsidered. When a goal is activated, the alarm
management process is not deleted; the effect of activating the
goal temporarily mitigates the intensityof the alarm. This mit-
igation effect decays over time, until the alarm will again be
triggered and the goal reconsidered. When a goal is activated,
the agent predicts when it should next consider the goal and
this determines the rate of decay of the mitigation. In this way,
the same alarm heuristic controls both goals to the considered
for achievement and goals to be reconsidered.
A goal that is activated by the agent will mitigate the rele-
vant alarm (e.g. the goal to satisfy an order placed by a cus-
tomer in the warehouse domain). Typically, the goal is acti-
vated before the time

 (figure 2), depending on the thresh-
old. The mitigation effect on the alarm will decay at a rate
such that the alarm will again trigger around

 . At this
point the agent will reconsider the goal. If the alarm is not
deleted, it is again mitigated until the deadline of the goal

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. If the goal to satisfy the customer’s order is not satisfied
and the deadline was correctly predicted, there may be no op-
tion other than to delete goal and alarm.   This is an example
of a goal that is no longer relevant to the agent’s alarms once
the deadline has passed and it is not satisfied (a goal with a firm
deadline). Other goals may still be relevant after the deadline
has passed; they may be even more urgent. This type of dead-
line represents the time at which the agent would like the goal
to be satisfied, not the time at which it must be satisfied: a soft
rather than a firm deadline.

A goal with a soft deadline will
continue to be reconsidered periodically until it is satisfied, or
the agent decides to delete the alarm for other reasons.
Managing uncertainty
A planning agent can never know for sure how long it will
take to satisfy a goal. If the agent underestimates this time,
it may wait too long before acting on the goal and the goal
may never be satisfied in time. This is a potential source of
error in the alarm heuristic. This period of time can only be
known once the goal has been successfully achieved. There-
fore, any mechanism for the scheduling of multiple goals may
suffer from such errors. This variable ( 
   (figure 2)) is de-
fined by the time period that the agent will allow for that goal
to be satisfied. In fact, such rules-of-thumb are common in
decision making. For example, if I intend to travel from one
part of London to another, I would simply allow an hour for
the journey. However, if I do not know where I must travel to
in the process of satisfying my intention, the importance that I

The deletion of a goal may have effects on other parts of the
agent; this change in internal state may subsequently cause other
alarms to be generated or modified.

The term hard deadline is avoided; this is only relevant for an
agent interacting with a real-time process.
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Figure 3: Example.
give to satisfying that goal will govern how much time I shall
allocate to the goal, and hence how far I could travel.
For the same reason, the time commitments made by the
agent in the process of planning cannot necessarily be deter-
mined. For example, the duration of the action to travel from
point A to point B can only be determined when both these
variables are bound. The agent may need to plan to seek fur-
ther information before this can be done. Again time is allo-
cated to these actions.
Extended example
Consider an agent that is designed to manage a warehouse.
This agent will have various influences on its behaviour in-
cluding satisfying orders placed by customers, maintaining
the levels of stock in the warehouse, ensuring the agent has
sufficient energy reserves to act on its intentions, etc. Figure 3
illustrates the behaviour of two alarms in a particular circum-
stance. These alarms encapsulate the goals to have satisfied an
order placed by a customer, and to have restocked the ware-
house with a certain commodity. (The time axis has been nor-
malised for clarity.)
At time t=0, the intensity of the alarm encapsulating the
goal to have satisfied the customer exists, but is at zero un-
til t=5 denoting that it is not sensible for the agent to act be-
fore this time. This may be due to the order containing com-
modities that will perish if kept in the unfavourable conditions
of the loading bay (e.g. frozen food). After this time (the de-
lay time), the intensity linearly increases until time t=20. At
this point, the agent detects that the customer has arrived ear-
lier that expected. This constitutes a danger to the satisfaction
of the goal, and so the intensity immediately increases above
the threshold. The agent’s attention is directed towards this
goal, it determines that it should act, and therefore activates
the goal to have satisfied the customer. The activation of this
goal causes the respective alarm to be mitigated. This mitiga-
tion decays over time until (at about time t=40) the intensity of
the alarm has again increased to the threshold, and the atten-
tion of the agent is directed towards reconsidering the goal. At
this point the agent recognises that at some time between t=20
and t=40, the goal was satisfied, and so the alarm is deleted.
At time t=20, the goal to have satisfied the customer’s or-
der is activated. It is important that the agent focuses a large
amount of its attention towards satisfying this goal; the goal is
very urgent and quite important. As the activity of the agent
increases, so does the threshold. At time t=38, the agent has
satisfied the goal, its activitydecreases, and so does the thresh-
old.
The alarm to restock the warehouse encapsulates a goal that
was generated through a replenishment process. The inten-
sity of this alarm increases to maximum (in this case the po-
tential of the alarm is 1) at around time t=35. However, be-
cause the agent is acting on the urgent goal to have satisfied
the customer, the sensitivity of the agent to new goals is re-
duced. The alarm does not trigger the attention of the agent
until some time later. At time t=50, the threshold has reduced
sufficiently for the attention of the agent to be directed towards
considering restocking the warehouse. The goal is activated,
and the alarm mitigated in the usual way.
Conclusion
An heuristic goal management mechanism has been pre-
sented: alarms. Alarms serve to focus an agent’s attention on
the most salient goals at any one time. This concentrates plan-
ning and reasoning effort and avoids unnecessary distractions.
Modern planning methods can then be employed to effective-
ness in the search for solutions to the given problems (the ac-
tive goals). The focus is continually updated as the situation
changes, and limited through manipulation of the threshold.
Additionally, goals generated through two distinctive and im-
portant types of process have been considered: D-Goals and
R-Goals. Goals created through both these processes are ef-
fectively managed within the same alarms mechanism.
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